Suddenly, the concept of coercive control is reshaping Canadian family law. Coercive control is beginning to influence how courts approach financial claims, property disputes, settlement negotiations, and even the procedural rules governing when a motion may be heard.
The recent decisions in Abu Kibash v. Gamal, 2026 ONSC 2969 and Gomez Duque v. Sanchez Hurtado, 2026 ONSC 3744 demonstrate this development. Together, they raise an important question: Can delay be used as an instrument to exert coercive control?
Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada expanded the legal importance of coercive control in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16. Coercive control is generally understood as a continuing pattern of controlling behaviour. It can move from the home into the parties’ finances. From access to bank accounts into access to information. From controlling the family’s money into controlling the pace, cost and structure of a divorce proceeding. That is, it can morph from personal intimidation into litigation strategy. That is the significance of Abu Kibash.
Under Rules 14(4) and 14(4.2) of Ontario’s Family Law Rules, a substantive motion will generally not be heard before a case conference unless there is urgency, hardship or another reason why dispensing with the conference is required in the interests of justice. For more than two decades, the leading authority has been Rosen v. Rosen, 2005 CanLII 480 (ONSC). Rosen requires a moving party seeking an urgent motion date to demonstrate, among other things, that available case conference dates have been investigated and that reasonable attempts at interim resolution have been made. Those requirements are sensible. They discourage litigation by ambush, preserve scarce judicial resources and encourage parties to resolve interim disputes without a motion. But Rosen was decided in 2005 – well before the concept of coercive control was flushed out in Ahluwalia.
In Abu Kibash, Associate Justice Kamal observed that the court system has changed considerably since then. He stated:
It is also important to consider the allegations of abuse and power dynamics in considering the test for urgency. We cannot allow the delays in the court system, including prolonged dates to get a case conference or motion, to further exert control over the process. This consideration favours granting the request for an urgent motion. I am concerned that the Respondent may be using the delays, the house, and not paying bills to inflict harm and control over the Applicant. This needs to be considered through a proper record at a motion.
The applicant in Abu Kibash had been a stay-at-home parent who alleged physical, sexual, emotional, psychological and financial abuse. She said that the respondent had stopped paying support and household expenses. The mortgage was in default, hydro arrears threatened the loss of electricity, property taxes were unpaid and the matrimonial home was at risk. The earliest regularly available case conference was several months away. Associate Justice Kamal accepted that the traditional principles in Rosen remained important. Urgent motions should remain exceptional. Parties should ordinarily try to resolve disputes. Courts should continue to discourage tactical or premature motions. However, the court concluded that a modern application of Rosen must account for coercive control.
In a coercive relationship, an insistence upon negotiation may not be neutral – it may be part of a pattern of coercive control. Requiring settlement discussions can expose a vulnerable party to additional manipulation, create further delay and reward the very person alleged to be obstructing a resolution. Delay may not affect both spouses equally. A financially dependent spouse facing mortgage enforcement, utility disconnection or loss of housing may experience delay very differently from the spouse who controls the income, information or family assets. Associate Justice Kamal therefore held that courts must consider serious and potentially irreparable harm caused by court delay within the factual context of alleged coercive control.
In Gomez Duque v. Sanchez Hurtado, the court considered Abu Kibash and although urgency was not found in that case, it stated:
Recently, an Associate Justice of this Court has opined that there are “limitations” to the Rosen approach and that new considerations must be applied, including a determination of the potential for delay to be a tool of coercive control (see Abu Kibash v. Gamal, 2026 ONSC 2969 at paragraphs 16 through 22). In the matter before him, A. J. Kamal relied upon evidence of other forms of family violence, including allegations of financial abuse as a tool of coercive control, to conclude that a motion for spousal support was urgent and could be brought prior to a case conference.
Financial manipulation and abuse can be used as weapons of coercive control. In an appropriate case, evidence of family violence may also relieve a party from the conventional expectation that further settlement negotiations occur before an urgent motion is scheduled.
The two court decisions are complementary. Abu Kibash opened the door. Gomez Duque identified the threshold for walking through it. Court delay and procedural requirements may form part of coercive control where the evidence demonstrates that a party is deliberately exploiting the process, financial dependency or institutional delay to maintain domination or inflict harm. Ordinary systemic delay, without that evidentiary connection, is not enough.
The law must remain capable of recognizing that litigation itself can be weaponized. At the same time, the term “coercive control” cannot become a substitute for evidence or a universal label for delay, disagreement or difficult litigation conduct. Not every missed deadline is coercive control. Not every refusal to settle is abuse. Not every financial default is deliberate. Not every request for an adjournment is an attempt to dominate the other party. The court must identify a pattern, a power imbalance and a connection between the impugned conduct and the resulting loss of autonomy, safety or meaningful access to justice.
It will no longer be sufficient merely to allege that the opposing party is controlling and that the court system is slow. The evidence should demonstrate how the alleged control is operating through the litigation process.
A persuasive record may include evidence that a party has:
- deliberately stopped paying support or essential household expenses while controlling the available income;
- refused to authorize the sale or refinancing of property while allowing arrears and penalties to accumulate;
- withheld financial disclosure necessary to obtain support or preserve assets;
- cancelled appraisals, meetings or agreed procedural steps;
- repeatedly changed positions after arrangements were made;
- refused reasonable interim proposals while knowing that the other spouse could not financially survive the delay;
- used adjournments or scheduling disputes strategically;
- exploited a power imbalance to make direct negotiation unsafe or meaningless; or
- created a foreseeable risk of foreclosure, utility disconnection, loss of housing, depletion of property or other non-compensable harm.
The broader significance of these cases extends beyond the scheduling of motions. The same reasoning may eventually influence decisions concerning disclosure, adjournments, exclusive possession, interim support, preservation orders, litigation conduct, costs and the suitability of particular dispute-resolution processes. For example, a court considering repeated disclosure defaults may ask whether the non-disclosure is simply disorganization or whether information is being strategically withheld to preserve financial dominance. A judge considering an adjournment may examine whether the request is legitimate or part of a pattern designed to exhaust the other party financially. A court addressing costs may consider whether litigation steps were taken for a genuine adjudicative purpose or to punish, intimidate or maintain control. An arbitrator may need to determine whether ordinary bargaining assumptions are valid where one party controls the finances, information or practical ability to withstand delay.
For decades, family law often treated parenting/financial disputes different than litigation conduct. The concept of coercive control reveals that they may form part of the same continuing pattern. A spouse who controlled all financial decisions during the marriage may continue that control by withholding disclosure after separation. A spouse who created financial dependency may exploit court delay by refusing support. A spouse who dominated every personal negotiation may use mandatory settlement expectations to force continued engagement on unequal terms. Together, they mark an important stage in the evolution of family law: coercive control is no longer relevant only to the final merits of a case. It may also shape how the case is managed, when judicial intervention is required and whether the ordinary procedural expectations are genuinely fair.
The challenge for courts will be to recognize procedural abuse without converting every procedural difficulty into abuse. The challenge for counsel will be to provide the evidence that permits the court to distinguish between the two.
This article was recently published in LEXIS NEXIS’s Law360® Canada at: https://www.law360.ca/ca/family/articles/2512766/coercive-control-enters-the-legal-test-for-urgency
Steve Benmor, B.Sc., LL.B., LL.M. (Family Law), C.S., Cert.F.Med., C.Arb., FDRP PC, Acc.D.C., is a full-time Divorce Mediator/Arbitrator and principal lawyer of Benmor Family Law Group, a boutique matrimonial law firm in downtown Toronto. He is a Certified Specialist in Family Law, a Certified Specialist in Parenting Coordination and was admitted as a Fellow to the prestigious International Academy of Family Lawyers. Steve is regularly retained as a Divorce Mediator/Arbitrator and Parenting Coordinator. Steve uses his 30 years of in-depth knowledge of family law, court-room experience and expert problem-solving skills in Divorce Mediation/Arbitration to help spouses reach fair, fast and cooperative divorce settlements without the financial losses, emotional costs and lengthy delays from divorce court.
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